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I. INTRODUCTION
R ationality in a legal system suggests a consistent set of legal proposi-
tions as well as methods for modifying, limiting, and expanding the
laws which are governed by some type of logical apparatus. It is a desir-
able characteristic because it furthers one of the primary ends of a legal
system: It facilitates social interaction by enabling members of society to
calculate the consequences of their conduct.' It is not an easy concept to
define, however. Different legal systems may be termed rational in differ-
ent ways. A judge who avoids existing legal rules and appeals to a sense of
justice or morality to solve the problem of a particular case may promote a
rational legal system just as much as a judge who follows existing legal
principles to reach a solution. A jurist who accepts certain legal rules
without question may be no more rational than the jurist who seeks to
limit or extend rules as new cases present themselves.
Rationality may take different forms, more or less formal, more or less
innovative. These different forms shall be examined to determine the type
of rationality which characterizes the Islamic legal system compared with
the common law. Max Weber 2 and Lawrence Friedman 3 provide the basic
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Univer-
sity; B.A. 1971, Harvard College; J.D. 1974, University of Pennsylvania; S.J.D. 1985, Harvard
Law School. The research for this paper was partially funded by a grant from the Cleveland-
Marshall Fund.
1 See H. BERMAN & W. GREINER, TiHE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW 31-33 (4th ed.
1980).
2 M. WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (2d ed. 1925), partially translated in M.
RHEINSTEIN, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 61-64 (1954).
3 L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 234-47 (1975).
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framework. Their classification systems for rational and irrational law-
making and lawfinding are fine models for legal analysis and are used
extensively in this Article. Their categorization of Islamic law, on the
other hand, misses the mark. It is my belief, illustrated by an example of
legal reasoning in Islamic contract law,4 that this widely known but little
understood system is a prime example of innovative logically formal ra-
tionality (as that term will be defined in this Article) at a point in history
when few other legal systems could claim the same.
II. WEBER'S SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION
Weber classifies legal reasoning (which he calls lawmaking and law-
finding) according to four different categories: rational, irrational, formal,
and substantive.' These categories are defined briefly below with exam-
ples drawn from Anglo-American law for illustration.
Formal irrationality exists when law is made or found in a way that is
beyond the control of reason, such as by oracle, ordeal, or appeal to a
prophet. A striking example of this kind of law existed in the oath and
ordeal of the folklaw in both the Frankish Empire and Anglo-Saxon Eng-
land from the sixth to the tenth centuries. The oath procedure required
the correct words to be spoken without mistake and the proper cere-
monial acts to be studiously performed. The ordeal sought to establish
guilt or innocence based on whether one sank in water or one's hand
blistered from the hot iron.6
Substantive irrationality is characterized by the absence of reason in
the lawmaking or lawfinding process. This category refers to ar-
bitrariness, emotions, or evaluations which are made without any refer-
ence to rules or general norms. The decree by a sovereign authority on the
basis of whim or caprice and the decision by a judge based on his emo-
tional feelings for one of the parties are both examples of this type of
lawmaking.7
The two categories of legal reasoning that consist of substantive and
formal rationality appear in the common law as policy considerations and
legal logic. Substantive rationality (policy considerations) is the category
of legal reasoning which appeals to general principles of a system exter-
nal to the legal system, such as religion, ethical thought," power policy, or
4 The analysis of Islamic contract law is based on a study by Chafik Chehata in ETUDES
DE DROIT MUSULMAN, L'Acte Juridique et le Fait Juridique en Droit Hanefite at 157-253
(1971).
5 See M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 61-64.
6 H. BERMAN & W GREINER, supra note 1, at 573.
7 Friedman feels that most legistlation is nonrational in the Weberian sense of the
term. See Friedman, On Legalistic Reasoning-A Footnote to Weber, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 148,
159.
a In French law the general principles of ethical thought are appealed to as "super-
eminent principles." R. DAVID & J. BRmarLv, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 137-41 (2d ed. 1978).
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some other clearly conceived and articulated system. Formal rationality
(legal logic) finds its basis in the logical derivation of concepts and rules
from existing legal premises.9 Both types of legal reasoning are illus-
trated in the example below, drawn from the law of property concerning
easements.10
If A and B each own neighboring pieces of land, called Appleacre and
Blackacre, respectively, A may want to use B's land, Blackacre, for pas-
sage to and from his own. A and B agree that A and all his successors in
ownership of Appleacre shall have the right to walk and drive over Black-
acre. This right is known as an easement. If, at a later time, B acquires
Appleacre and then resells it to X, the question arises whether the ease-
ment still exists over Blackacre for the benefit of X.
The easement is considered a right in a thing belonging to another (ius
in re aliena). By legal definition it cannot be a right in a thing belonging
to oneself. Therefore, legal logic would dictate the destruction of the ease-
ment upon the acquisition of Appleacre by B, and X would not have the
easement. This is legal reasoning in the category of formal rationality. It
foregoes all considerations of economic, social, or other policies.
9 Weber describes the process by which German law became formally rational:
[The reception of the Roman law] strengthened that tendency of the legal institu-
tions themselves to become more and more abstract, which had begun already
with the transformation of the Roman ins civile into the law of the Empire. As
Ehrlich has properly emphasized, in order for them to be received at all, the
Roman legal institutions had to be cleansed of all remnants of national contextual
association and to be elevated into the sphere of the logically abstract; and Roman
law itself had to be absolutized as the very embodiment of right reason. The six
centuries of Civil Law jurisprudence have produced exactly this result. At the
same time, the modes of legal thought were turned more and more in the direction
of formal logic. The occasional brilliant apercus of the Roman jurists of the kind
just noted were torn out of the context of the concrete cases of the Pandects and
were raised to the level of ultimate legal principles from which deductive argu-
ments were to be derived. Now there was created what the Roman jurists had so
obviously lacked, viz., the purely systematic categories, such as "legal transac-
tion" or "declaration of intention," for which ancient jurisprudence did not even
have names. Above all, the proposition that what the jurist cannot conceive has no
legal existence now acquired practical significance. Among the ancient jurists, as
a result of the historically conditioned analytical nature of Roman legal thought,
properly "constructive" ability, even though it was not entirely absent, was only of
small significance. Now when this law was transposed into entirely strange fact
situations, unknown in antiquity, the task of "construing" the situation in a log-
ically impeccable way became almost the exclusive task. In this way that concep-
tion of law which still prevails today and which sees in law a logically consistent
and gapless complex of "norms" waiting to be "applied" became the decisive con-
ception for legal thought.
M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 276-77.
10 This example is drawn in slightly modified form from Max Rheinstein's Introduction
to MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 2, at li-lii. See also R.
CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 465 nn.12-13
(1984)(discussing minority and majority views regarding revival of easements).
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Legal reasoning in the category of substantive rationality (policy con-
siderations) would take into account such questions as whether it is desir-
able, in the interest of more efficient utilization of land, that such an
easement come to an end at some time. If so, by what events should such
termination be brought about? It may be preferable from the viewpoint of
economic considerations of efficiency to look to the expiration of a max-
imum period of time firmly fixed by the law, rather than the accidental
circumstance of title to both pieces of land becoming united in the hands
of the same owner. In any case, the legal solution is not dictated by a
formal chain of legal reasoning but rather by consideration of the under-
lying policy reasons behind the rule.
Weber further subdivides the category of formal rationality into logical
and extrinsic. Logically formal rationality exists "where the legally rele-
vant characteristics of the facts [in a decided" legal case?] are disclosed
through the logical analysis of [its] meaning and where, accordingly,
definitely fixed legal concepts in the form of highly abstract rules are
formulated and applied."' 2 This category promotes the development of
"legal propositions of high logical sublimation" and ultimately leads to
Itan integration of all analytically derived legal propositions in such a way
that they constitute a logically clear, internally consistent, and, at least in
theory, gapless system of rules.1 3 According to Weber, this attempt at
systematization reached its high point in civil law by the construction of
codes to govern all legal situations.
Extrinsically formal rationality, on the other hand, is the "adherence to
external characteristics of the facts, for instance, the utterance of certain
words, the execution of a signature, or the performance of a certain sym-
bolic act with a fixed meaning."'14 It seeks to construct legal relations and
legal institutions by "a merely paratactic association analogy of extrinsic
elements"'15 without attempting a logical analysis of the meaning behind
these legal relations.16 Highly comprehensive schemes of legal casuistry
11 The term "decided" refers to any case whether decided by God in the Koran or sunna
(Islamic law) or by the judge in precedent (common law).
12 M. R nsTmn, supra note 2, at 63.
1' Id. at 62.
14 Id. at 63.
15 Id. at 62.
16 A good example of the distinction between logically and extrinsically formal ra-
tionality may be taken from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Allegheny College v. Nat'l Chau-
tauqua Co. Bk., 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927). In that case, Mary Yates Johnston gave a
pledge of $5,000 to Allegheny College with the following indorsement: "In loving memory
this gift shall be known as the Mary Yates Johnston memorial fund, the proceeds from
which shall be used to educate students preparing for the ministry ... " Id. at 370, 159 N.E.
at 174. Two and a half years later, the sum of $1,000 was paid on this pledge and the college
set it aside for a scholarship fund. A year and a half later the pledge was repudiated, and an
action was eventually brought by the college to recover the unpaid balance. Justice Cardozo
found that the pledge became a contract upon the college's acceptance of the $1,000 payment
because there was consideration. Id. at 372, 159 N.E. at 176. The consideration was the
[Vol. 34:97
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may develop within this category, but ultimately there is no systematiza-
tion according to Weber. Rather, he states, [o]nly that abstract method [of
logically formal rationality] which employs the logical interpretation of
meaning allows the execution of the specifically systematic task, i.e., the
collection and rationalization by logical means of all the several rules
recognized as legally valid into an internally consistent complex of ab-
stract legal propositions. 1 7
III. FRIEDMAN'S SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION
Lawrence Friedman approaches the concept of legal reasoning from a
different perspective than Weber; however, his four categories of legal
reasoning overlap with the two rational categories of Weber. Friedman's
categories are divided according to whether legal reasoning has an open
or closed canon of legal propositions and according to whether innovation
is denied or accepted within the system. 8 A closed system exists when the
decisionmakers distinguish between legal propositions and non-legal
propositions, then base their decisions only on the former. An open system
makes no distinction between the two. The term "innovation" is used in
the sense that new legal premises may be expected to arise.19
Friedman does not address the categories of irrational lawmaking or
detriment suffered by the promisee (Allegheny College) when it assumed personal responsi-
bility for giving effect to the condition that the fund be known as the Mary Yates Johnston
Memorial fund. There was no express undertaking by the college to give effect to this
condition, but Justice Cardozo found (through a technical fiction?) that the college had
implicitly undertaken this duty. Thus, the concept of consideration, which is defined to
include detriment explicitly assumed by the promisee, was extended in scope to include
detriment implicitly assumed by the promisee in this case. This process of lawmaking may
be called extrinsically formal rationality.
On the other hand, Justice Cardozo suggested that several New York cases could be read
as enforcing a promise without consideration-or at least without consideration in the
traditional sense of the term. Cf. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel in New York, 15 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 27 (1949) (consideration was found in these cases). These cases involved the incurring of
expense by the promisee with the promisor's knowledge on the reasonable belief by the
promisee that the promise would be kept. According to Cardozo, the breach of such a
promise was considered "more or less subconsciously" by the judges in these cases as a
breach of faith and an unwarrantable disappointment of reasonable expectations. Allegheny
College, 246 N.Y. at 371, 159 N.E. at 174. Thus, recourse could be made to a new doctrine of
promissory estoppel to govern such cases-a doctrine which attaches through abstraction
from the concrete facts of these decided cases and the logical interpretation of their mean-
ing. This process of lawmaking may be called logically formal rationality.
Justice Cardozo distinguished the doctrine of promissory estoppel from consideration as
involving a detriment which was merely the consequence of a promise rather than its
inducement. His discussion indicates his desire (although not his action in this particular
case) to build new rules through logical interpretation of the given precedents' meaning
rather than by artificial expansion through technical fictions.
17 M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 64.
5 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 238.
19 Id. at 237.
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lawfinding found in Weber's classification scheme. He narrows his inquiry
to the "formal, authoritative exposition [of the decision-maker], which
purports to show how and why a decision-maker reached his particular
conclusion."20 The four categories which Friedman constructs for various
types of legal reasoning overlap Weber's two rational categories.
The first category, called Sacred, has a closed canon of legal proposi-
tions and denies innovation.21 The legal systems which most closely ap-
proximate this category, according to Friedman, are the conservative
book-religions with a single sacred text-hence the name Sacred. Fried-
man includes in this category the basic features of Judaic and Islamic law
as well as the concept of "mechanical" jurisprudence in the late nine-
teenth century common law which appealed to rules considered certain
and unchanging.
Friedman's second category of legal reasoning also consists of a closed
canon of legal propositions but accepts innovation. This ideal type is
called Legal Science, the idea being that science is a cumulative phe-
nomenon. "In the short run, the canon of premises is fixed, but the known
canon of premises is not the same as the potential canon. Jurists can
"'discover' new propositions, improve old ones, and show fresh rela-
tionships. '22 This category is best exemplified by the civil law system in
which judges link specific decisions to general codes of law. Within this
category, Friedman also includes the aspect of nineteenth century com-
mon law wherein judges were considered "trained in the science or art of
'finding' and applying principles of law."23
These two categories, which have a closed canon of legal propositions,
approximate Weber's two categories of logically formal rationality24 and
extrinsically formal rationality. Each author merely emphasizes different
aspects of the same form of rationality. Weber does not distinguish be-
tween the innovative and non-innovative aspects of his two categories of
formal rationality. On the other hand, Friedman does not distinguish
between the logical and extrinsic aspects of each of his two categories of a
closed system.
Friedman's third category in which the canon of premises is open and
innovation is denied, is called Customary.25 Traditional or customary
legal systems such as that of the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia fall within
this category. Law is custom, experience, common sense, or morality with
no distinction between what is a legal norm and what is a social norm. In
contrast, Friedman's fourth category is called Instrumental and dis-
2 Id. at 235.
21 Id. at 238-40.
2 Id. at 241.
23 Id.
2A Weber refers to logically formal rationality as legal science. M. RzmsINmn', supra
note 2, at 64.
2 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 242.
[Vol. 34:97
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tinguishes between legal and non-legal norms.2 6 The canon of premises is
open to encompass both types of norms, with innovation now possible.
Decisionmakers can, but are not obliged to, invoke non-legal norms to
change rules or their application. Friedman finds that in the United
States courts seem to be moving in this direction in the form of welfare
legality.2
7
Friedman explains that his Instrumental category resembles Weber's
category of substantive rationality. The appeal to a set of norms external
to the legal system is rational. Friedman develops the concept of substan-
tive rationality further, however, by distinguishing between the extra-
legal norm that is followed through felt obligation and that which is
followed by choice. The former belongs to the Customary category; the
norm of morality is applied because it exists, and one already feels bound
by it legally. The latter belongs to the Instrumental category; the norm of
morality is applied because of the significance or value in the norm itself,
rendering it appropriate for inclusion in the legal system. These two
categories might be termed non-innovative and innovative substantive
rationality, respectively.
If one were to integrate the two classification schemes of Weber and
Friedman, the result might be diagrammed as follows:
1 Innovative 2 Innovative Innovative
Logically Extrinsically Substantive
Formal Formal Rationality
Rationality Rationality
.......................... .....4 5................. ................. --...... .........................
Non-Innovative 5 Non-Innovative 6 Non-Innovative
Logically Extrinsically Substantive
Formal Formal Rationality
Rationality Rationality
SubstantiveFormal Irrationality Irrationality
26 See id. at 243-44.
27 Friedman maintains:
Such a court would admit, as starting points for legal reasoning, policy norms of
all sorts, scientific truths, and statements of enlightened opinion-whatever
would help guide the court to a better result, a result more in keeping with public
policy, general welfare, or the social good. Each particular rule would have its goal
or reason, fixing its place in the general web of social policy. Reasoning would be
free, frank, and rational, never technical or legalistic.
1985-86]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
IV. A CLARIFICATION OF LEGAL LOGIC
This Article focuses on formal rationality-extrinsic and logical in
Weber's terms, sacred and legal science in Friedman's. This is the area of
legal logic. Clarifying the meaning of this term is important. Legal logic
does not consist merely of a major premise, minor premise, and conclu-
sion. This is the classic syllogism exemplified in the proposition: All peo-
ple can think; Socrates is a person; therefore Socrates can think. Rather,
legal logic (whether in the form of deduction, induction, or analogy) is
actually a defective form of the purely scientific process of logical
argument.
Donald Hermann 28 aptly describes the defects. The deductive model of
legal reasoning is defective because it "(1) depends on the belief in pre-
determined conceptions, (2) does not indicate a method of choosing be-
tween competing propositions, and (3) requires an impossible system of
classification for characterizing the factual situations that will be formu-
lated into minor premises."29 The inductive model is likewise inadequate
because the jurist formulates a rule for the purpose of resolving disputes,
not to account for observed raw data. The data of legal reasoning is trans-
formed by abstraction and characterization. Finally, the analogical
model, which can be described in three stages, also lacks the restrictions
of a truly scientific model. The three stages are: "(1) perception of relevant
likenesses between the factual issue as defined by the court and previous
cases; (2) determination of the ratio decidendi of the previous case; and (3)
the decision to apply the previous case to the present controversy. ''30 The
analogical model is problematic in that the first step represents a psycho-
logical process which cannot be restricted solely by elements in the legal
system; rather, it involves conscious and subconscious mental processes
not governed by the legal system itself.
With this fluid concept of legal logic, it is a short step to the realization
that the exercise of a formally rational mode of thought may easily coexist
with substantively rational and even irrational modes of thought in the
solution of a legal problem. Substantive rationality in the form of moral
and economic values may consciously or unconsciously motivate the deci-
sionmaker to choose a certain legal solution to a legal problem. Irra-
tionality in the form of emotions or arbitrariness may also influence the
process of reasoning by analogy through the decisionmaker's perception of
relevant likenesses. This overlap between categories in the classification
system is an important factor in a legal system, permitting flexibility to
coexist with certainty, and humanity to coexist with mechanics.
Nevertheless, in an attempt to find the category of rationality into
28 Hermann, A Stucturalist Approach to Legal Reasoning, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131,
1131-39 (1975).
29 Id. at 1135.
30 Id. at 1138.
[Vol. 34:97
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which Islamic law falls, we are forced, as with every other legal system, to
concentrate primarily on the modes of legal reasoning which are evinced
by the jurists. Note also that it is the modes evinced by the jurists. There
is no certain method to determine if the decisionmaker is actually moti-
vated by substantively rational values or by emotions in deriving his
judgment. His decision and argument are the only indicators. This data
removes us from the arena of motivation, leaving only the decisionmaker's
justification for analysis. If the decisionmaker deliberately appeals to
rational values or to emotions to justify his judgment, the reasoning pro-
cess may be classified as rational or irrational, regardless of what actually
motivated his judgment.31 Motivation may be important; however, data
from the Islamic system, as from any legal system where other data is not
available, is drawn from final decisions alone, i.e., the justificatory
process.
With this caveat Islamic law may be examined to determine the cate-
gory of rationality within which it falls. In particular, the classification
systems of Weber and Friedman provide the framework for demonstrat-
ing their own misconceptions concerning the Islamic system. Both have
placed Islamic law within the category of non-innovative formal ra-
tionality. Yet the texts show differently.
V. CLASSIFICATIONS OF ISLAMIC LEGAL REASONING
According to Weber, Islamic law became absolutely fixed around the
seventh or eighth century of Islam (13th or 14th century A.D.). 32 Legal
reasoning was subordinate to both fixed interpretative methods and vague
authoritative commentaries. Innovation, if it took place, was through dis-
putatious theoretical casuistry without contact with life. 33 Weber con-
cludes:
As a consequence of these factors, together with the already men-
tioned inadequacy of the formal rationality of juridical thought,
systematic lawmaking, aiming at legal uniformity or consistency,
was impossible. The sacred law could not be disregarded; nor
could it, despite many adaptations, be really carried out in prac-
tice. As in the Roman system, officially licensed jurists can be
called on for their opinions by the Khadis, or parties, as the occa-
sion arises. Their opinions34 are authoritative, but they also vary
31 Notably, although two legal systems may be classified as formally rational within this
perception, one system may be far more flexible than the other depending on the attitude of
the decisionmaker toward restrictions on his judicial or juristic function and the propriety of
judicial or juristic lawmaking. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAw SYsTEM:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 1142-61 (2d ed. 1977).
12 M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 238-39.
-' Id. at 219, 240-41.
34 The jurists' opinions are termed "fatwas." The jurist who delivers a fatwa is called a
mufti.
1985-861
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from person to person; like the opinions of oracles, they are given
without any statement of rational reasons. Thus they actually
increase the irrationality of the sacred law rather than contrib-
ute, however slightly, to its rationalization.
35
According to Weber, Islamic juristic reasoning appears to have been, at
best, a lower form of formal rationality-of the extrinsic variety.3 6 Fur-
thermore, it appears to have been static and incapable of developing legal
relations or institutions of any sophisticated character, i.e., it was non-
innovative. In the diagram above, Islamic reasoning would fit within Box
#5. Weber finds that since Islam's "immutable" tradition was taken se-
riously by the jurists, legal education remained limited to empirical and
mechanical memorization and theoretical casuistry,37 thus impeding
legal unification and consistency.
3 8
How does this categorization compare with that of the common law?
Weber finds that the common law did not achieve the highest form of
formal rationality. At least "up to the time of Austin, there was prac-
tically no English legal science which would have merited the name of
'learning' in the continental sense. ' 39 Continental Europe came closest to
the category of logically formal rationality, but "[q]uite definitely, English
law-finding [was] not, like that of the Continent, 'application' of 'legal
propositions' logically derived from statutory texts. ' 4 Weber attributed
the difference between the civil and common law to the "purely empirical
and practical training" of lawyers in the craft guilds 41 known as the Inns
of Court. 42 These guilds aimed to produce "a practically useful scheme of
contract and actions, oriented towards the interests of clients in typically
recurrent situations,"'43 not to develop a rationally consistent system as
sought in the continental university system of legal education:
35 M. RHEINSrEm, supra note 2, at 241.
36 It is important to distinguish between Weber's conception of legal reasoning per-
formed by the mufti, the agent for legal development in Islam, and his conception of legal
reasoning performed by the qadi, who merely applied the law. We treat the former here. The
latter was regarded by Weber as having unlimited discretion in his manner of judgment-
making and thus was an example of substantively irrational law. See Weber's conception of
qadi justice in supra note 2, at 213 n.48, 317, 318, 351-52, 353; see also B. TURNER, WEBER
AND ISLAM: A CRITcAL STUDY 109 (1974). This misconception appears to have influenced
several American judges. See J. Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law, 33 AM. J.
COMP. L. 63, 63-64 (1985).
37 See M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 219. But see G. MAKDISI, THE RISE OF COLLEGES:
INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN ISLAM AND THE WEST (1981) for convincing evidence to the
contrary.
31 See M. RHE sTmN, supra note 2, at 242.
3 Id. at 316.
40 Id. at 317.
41 Id. at 201.
42 For a discussion of the probable influence of Islam on the formation of the Inns of
Court, see G. Makdisi, The Guilds of Law in Medieval Legal History: An Inquiry into the
Origins of the Inns of Court, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 3 (1985-86).
4 M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 201.
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From such practices and attitudes no rational system of law could
emerge nor even a rationalization of the law as such because the
concepts thus formed are constructed in relation to the material,
and concretely experienceable events of everyday life, are dis-
tinguished from each other by external criteria, and extended in
their scope, as new needs arise, by means of the techniques just
mentioned. They are not "general concepts" which would be
formed by abstraction from concreteness or by logical interpreta-
tion of meaning or by generalization and subsumption; nor were
these concepts apt to be used in syllogistically applicable norms.
In the purely empirical conduct of legal practice and legal train-
ing one always moves from the particular to the particular but
never tries to move from the particular to general propositions in
order to be able subsequently to deduce from them the norms for
new particular cases. This reasoning is tied to the word, the word
which is turned around and around, interpreted, and stretched in
order to adapt it to varying needs, and, to the extent that one has
to go beyond, recourse is had to "analogies" or technical fictions."
The common law, at least before the nineteenth century, thus falls
within the same category as Islamic law-extrinsically formal ra-
tionality; however, it differs from Islamic law. Although both legal sys-
tems started with a base of legal norms, Weber maintains that Islamic
law was fixed in the sense that little, if any, development of legal relations
or institutions took place. According to Weber, fatwas were given without
any statement of reasons and therefore did not contribute to a process of
rational development. 45 In the common law, on the other hand, analogies
and fictions were used to develop a sufficiently elastic pattern of contracts
and actions which were necessary to serve the needs of interested parties.
The common law was therefore innovative and would be classified within
Box #2 above, while Islamic law was non-innovative and would be classi-
fied within Box #5.
Weber's differentiation between the Islamic and common law systems is
derived from his description of each system. He does not explicitly charac-
terize one system as "innovative" and the other not. It is Friedman who
uses this terminology to emphasize the dichotomy between the two sys-
tems. As we have noted,46 Friedman classifies Islamic law as a closed set of
premises denying innovation. Once the sacred text was fixed, "there could
be no new premises; the 'gates of legislation' were 'closed'. '47 As "[t]he
ancient texts became more and more out of date," Friedman continues,
4 Id. at 201-02.
45 As noted above, the mufti (jurist) who delivered a fatwa (legal opinion) is to be
distinguished from the qadi (judge) who delivered a qada' (judgment). See supru note 36.
46 See supra text accompanying note 21.
47 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 239 (footnote omitted).
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such "systems ran heavily to casuistry, legalism, legal fiction, and a lux-
uriant growth of reasoning by analogy."8 Rather than developing useful
concepts to regulate the affairs of everyday life, however, Islamic scholars
"debated such questions as the 'precise moment at which succession opens
to the estate of a person turned to stone by the devil.' 49 Thus Islamic law
falls within the category of non-innovative formal rationality (Boxes #4
and #5 without differentiation between the two).
The common law, on the other hand, can be characterized partly as non-
innovative formal rationality (mechanical jurisprudence) and partly as
innovative formal rationality (judges as craftsmen of the law).50 Within
the latter category (Boxes #1 and #2 without differentiation between the
two), Friedman maintains, discovery, perfection, and analysis of legal
propositions led to a growth and sophistication unrealized in Islamic law.
Thus, both Weber and Friedman depict the common law in an inno-
vative role while denying any innovation in Islamic legal reasoning. Isla-
mic law, as opposed to the common law, had no growth potential; in this
sense it was inferior to the common law. Weber classifies both legal sys-
tems in the category of extrinsically formal rationality. Friedman does
not distinguish between extrinsic and logical. Summarizing by reference
to the chart above, Weber would place Islamic law in Box #5 and the
common law in Box #2. Friedman would place Islamic law in Boxes #4
and #5 combined and the common law (with the concept that judges are
craftsmen of the law) in Boxes #1 and #2 combined. Friedman also finds
that several courts in the United States "seem to be moving slowly and
slightly" in the direction of innovative substantive rationality (Box #3),
but he is not convinced that there is a strong pull in this direction.5'
Although the common law still clings to archaic concepts such as seisin52
in the law of property, which betokens an extrinsically formal character of
law, the recognized need for consistent and predictable logical concepts in
law focuses the attention of law professors and students, as well as judges
and lawyers, on legal rationales for decisions which make sense as an
integrated whole. The common law is innovative and its rationality is
logically formal (Box #1) as Friedman indicates. Furthermore, I believe,
without attempting to prove at this time, that there has been a marked
shift in concentration toward conscious recognition of the interplay be-
tween logically formal rationality (Box #1) and substantive rationality
(Box #3) in judicial thought processes. American realists have guided
American legal thought away from the archaic concept of mechanical
" Id. at 239.
49 Id.
10 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
51 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 244.
52 The concept of seisin was popular in feudal terms. It was "[tihe completion of the
feudal investiture, by which the tenant was admitted into the feud, and performed the rights
of homage and fealty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1218 (5th ed. 1979).
[Vol. 34:97
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss1/10
FORMAL RATIONALITY
jurisprudence to a more realistic perception that judges and jurists are
and should be creative in integrating policy considerations within the
fabric of the legal reasoning process.
Is it true, however, that Islamic law was non-innovative? In the next
section legal reasoning in Islamic contract law," is examined to demon-
strate the manner in which Islamic law not only strove for consistency,
but also "'discover[ed]' new propositions, improve[d] old ones, and
show[ed] fresh relationships."' The example from contract law suggests
that the classification of Islamic law is not within Boxes #4 and #5 but
rather within Box #1.
VI. A REEVALUATION
In the ideal type of extrinsically formal rationality, the law focuses on
particular legal characteristics of a situation to determine the governing
rule without regard for the rule's underlying rationale. No attempt is
made for legal uniformity or consistency in the legal system as a whole.
The ideal type of logically formal rationality-a gapless system of consis-
tent norms governing every factual situation which might arise-is ab-
sent. It was not absent, however, in Islamic law. There is strong evidence
that, even in the early years of Islamic law, the Islamic jurists were
seriously concerned with achieving a system of internally consistent
norms to govern new situations. Early in the private law of what is known
today as contract and tort law, a basic, but vaguely defined, distinction
existed between juristic acts and juristic facts. Efforts to achieve consis-
tency in the law generated an investigation into, and a resultant contro-
versy over, the meaning behind the external characteristics of these
juristic acts and juristic facts. The result was a process of legal reasoning
which may be characterized as innovative logically formal rationality.
In the early period, the notion of contract itself was not clearly defined.
It appears to have consisted of two verbal declarations, backed by will.55
Two centuries later this notion became more specific. The contract of sale
was seen as a juristic act created by an offer and acceptance formulated in
the past tense and backed by intelligence (caql) and will (qasd). The juris-
tic act was distinguished from the juristic fact (e.g., damaging the good of
another) by the legal effect of incapacity. Minority, slavery, or insanity
made the juristic act (but not the juristic fact) void. 6 Professor Chehata
has concluded that the characteristic distinguishing juristic acts from
juristic facts at this time was the existence of will as a necessary element
5 See C. CHEHATA, supra note 4.
SL. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 241.
55 C. CHEHATA, supra note 4, at 164, discussing the oldest work on Hanafite law, the Asl
of Shaybani (189/804).
5 Id. at 166-68 (discussing the MuKIrrsAR of Quduri (428/1037)).
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in the former but not in the latter57 "Will" appears to have been defined as
the intention to act, requiring intelligence but not "consent" as that term
is understood today, i.e., as voluntariness.5
By the sixth century of Islam, a new perspective on the distinction
between juristic acts and juristic facts was offered. Not merely the legal
effect of capacity, but the intrinsic nature of the act itself, distinguished
the two. Until this time juristic acts were considered facts-facts of the
tongue, but facts nevertheless-which were cognizable by the senses.
Materiality of the juristic act was accented.5 9 Kasani,6° a Hanafite jurist,
shifted emphasis to the abstract character of the juristic act-the legal
effect conferred on the act by law. In a sales contract, the abstract fact was
the transfer of property. This was distinguishable from the concrete fact of
damage done to another's property which constituted a juristic fact.6 1
Kasani ultimately returned, however, to the rational element which con-
ferred on the act its juristic nature.62 This element, established by capac-
ity in the individual, determined which acts were juristic. Kasani also
mentioned intention (qasd) although it is not clear whether this term
signified an act of reason or an act of independent will.63 Marghinani, a
contemporary of Kasani, helped clarify the fact that the term qasd at the
basis of the juristic act was intention, the act of will to make the verbal
declaration .64
A new development then occurred through the analysis of the non-
serious declaration made as a joke. This declaration was considered de-
void of legal effect. Babarti, one of the commentators on Marghinani's
work, reasoned that this qualification of the non-serious declaration was
due to the fact that qasd was absent from it.5 This analysis promoted the
idea that qasd was an act of will to produce the legal effect of the verbal
declaration. In the non-serious declaration, the declarant intended to pro-
nounce the required expression, but did not intend to make the declara-
tion produce its effects of law. In order to explain the lack of legal effect
given to such a declaration and yet retain consistency with the notion
that qasd was a sufficient element to give legal effect to a verbal declara-
tion, qasd now had to be reformulated. In addition to the elements of
57 Id. at 168.
68 See id.
59 See id. at 171 (discussing the MABsuT of Sarakhsi (483/1090)).
60 See id. at 176-82 (discussing the BADA'IC As-SANA'IC of Kasani (587/1191)).
61 Id. at 179.
62 Id. at 179-81.
63 Id. at 181. The term rida (consent) also appears in Kasani's work, but not as an
element in the formation of the contract. Rather, consent is an element of the contract's
validity. See id. at 182.
6 See id. at 186 (discussing the HIDAYA of Marghinani (593/1197) (translated by C.
HAMILTON, THE HEDAYA, OR GUIDE: A COMMENTARY ON THE MussuLMAN LAws (S. Grady
2d ed. London 1870))).
6 See id. at 187 (discussing the CINAYA of Babarti (786/1384)).
[Vol. 34:97
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss1/10
FORMAL RATIONALITY
reason and intention to pronounce the declaration, this concept was re-
defined to include the intention to make the declaration produce its legal
effects. Without this latter intention, as in the case of the non-serious
declaration, the declaration was null and void.
Thus, capacity no longer sufficed to define the term qasd. One having
capacity could still emit a non-serious declaration, and it would be void.
Yet concern still remained about a contract formed under the threat of
violence. Such a contract lacked consent (rida), but it was still considered
formed. Some Hanafite jurists attributed the same legal effect of the non-
serious declaration to the contract made under the threat of violence,
considering it void.66 Qadi Zada, another commentator on Marghinani's
work, clarified the distinction between the two cases by distinguishing
qasd from rida. The contract under violence had qasd, i.e., the intention
to bind oneself It did not have will (rida), the desire to enter into the
contract or to have its legal effects. The non-serious contract, on the other
hand, had neither of these two elements.6 7 Qasd thus remained the nec-
essary element for contract formation. The absence of rida did not prevent
the contract from being formed; it merely prevented it from being valid
until rida could be obtained through ratification.
Classical Hanafite law accepted this definition of intention at the basis
of the juristic act as distinct from the concept of consent.M This definition
gave a consistent interpretation to qasd as a necessary element of con-
tract formation. There were three aspects to the concept of intention: (1)
the intention to pronounce the declaration, (2) qasd as the intention to
have its legal effects, and (3) rida as consent to the legal effects. The first
and second terms were necessary to form the contract; the third was not.
Rida was only necessary for the validity of the contract. In the case of
violence, the first two elements existed, and therefore the contract was
formed, albeit vitiated. In the non-serious contract, only the first term
existed, making the contract null and void. In the case of a contract
entered into by a drunkard, all three terms were absent; therefore, the
contract was null and void.
One practical question arising from this analysis is whether the con-
tract formed under threat of violence may have been considered a non-
serious contract and thereby declared null and void. In Hanafite Islamic
law a declaration could not be considered non-serious unless it had been
preceded by another declaration which revealed its true nature. This
necessity for an objective manifestation of the absence of intent prevented
the contract formed under violence from being considered non-serious.6 9
6 Id. at 189.
67 See id. at 190 (discussing the NATA'LJ AL-AFKAR of Qadi Zada (988/1580)).
68 See id. at 190-96 (discussing the RADD AL-MUHTAR of Ibn Abidin (1252/1836)). See
also id. at 250-53 (Chehatas conclusion to his study of juristic act and juristic fact in
Hanafite Islamic law).
0 See id. at 195-96.
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The growing understanding among Islamic jurists of the difference
between juristic act and juristic fact, and the elements necessary to form a
juristic act, helped to establish and explain the legal effects of both the
non-serious declaration and the declaration made under violence. Some
jurists wanted to classify the two together and attribute to them the same
legal effects.70 By examining the meaning behind these acts, a solution
was "discovered" and made consistent with the whole concept of juristic
act. A system governed by extrinsically formal rationality would not have
attempted to reconcile the legal effects of these declarations. Only
through innovative logically formal rationality was an effort made to
develop a consistent set of legal propositions and solutions. Terms were
defined and redefined until a structure was finally evolved in which the
elements of the formation of a juristic act were satisfactorily settled.
VII. CONCLUSION
As jurists, we should not hastily formulate our opinions about the
nature of a legal system such as Islamic law, which is only in an incipient
stage of research. Weber and Friedman offer wonderful structures within
which to classify a legal system, but Islamic law is not yet ready to be
classified. More work in the manner of Professor Chehata's study needs to
be accomplished. However, the example of legal reasoning in contract law
indicates that Islamic law may well fit within the category of innovative
logically formal rationality. If further studies bear out this classification,
it will confirm Islam's very own conception of its legal system. In Islam,
the very term for jurisprudence- fiqh-means understanding, com-
prehension; and the manner in which it is reached-ijtihad-means the
exertion of a diligent effort of individual judgment.
70 See id. at 189.
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